Modelling Housing Market Search by William A. V. Clark

Modelling Housing Market Search by William A. V. Clark

Author:William A. V. Clark [Clark, William A. V.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780312535360
Barnesnoble:
Goodreads: 3906892
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 1982-09-01T00:00:00+00:00


Both classes of measurements may be further differentiated depending upon the decision to include the ordering of observed vacancies as an aspect of the measurement problem. For example, if the ordering of the sequence is deemed unimportant, then a search pattern might be summarized by the number of vacancies seen in each small area of the city. If ordering is maintained, then the summary measure would be the ordered sequence of small areas corresponding to the areas in which the observed vacancies are located. If measurements are in terms of distance, a distribution of interpoint distances for the set of observed vacancies could be generated; whereas, a distance measure over the ordered set might be the ordered sequence of distances between the first vacancy observed and each observed vacancy thereafter.

Residential search is assumed to occur under the following general conditions:

Each household has a conditional utility V { p, Y-M, X} for housing with price, p, of non-housing commodities, income, Y, price or rent, M of a given dwelling, and a set of attributes, X, of the house.

A reservation utility level VC exists for a given household such that a vacancy i having a utility, Vi ≥ VC would be chosen if seen. To simplify the problem, it is assumed that VC remains constant during the search process. Let A be the set of all vacancies i with Vi ≥ VC .

An information source S, exists which provides information on selected attributes of a given vacancy i such that a household using this source to gain information about a vacancy i is aware of some but not all of the elements in the set {Mi, xil,…xin} which completely describes the attributes of the vacancy 1 where Bi = {Li |S} is the subset of attributes defining i for which S provides information. Note that S may or may not accurately report information on a given attribute of i. The “value” of a given information source is therefore a function not only of the “kinds” of information provided but also is a function of the “accuracy” of the information. Furthermore, the information source may be biased in the sense that all vacancies do not have an equal chance of being reported by S and the accuracy may also vary over the set of reported vacancies.

Given a sequence of vacancies for which S provides information, the household has a decision rule which is used to assign each vacancy in I-I to one of two disjoint sets: the set of vacancies, R, which can be rejected solely on the basis of information provided on B; and the set of vacancies, N, which cannot be rejected without direct investigation on the part of the household.

A vacancy which is a member of N is assumed to have a constant probability K of being chosen by the household if it is visited by a household. The search process may also be terminated because the household decides to stop searching and to remain in its present location. The



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